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Christopher J. O’Leary and Randall W. Eberts

Personal Reemployment
Accounts
P

roposed legislation called the
Back to Work Incentive Act of 2003
introduced a new model for customer
choice among publicly funded
reemployment services. The Bush
administration recommended a two-year
federal budget of $3.6 billion to provide
each eligible unemployment insurance
(UI) claimant a personal reemployment
account (PRA) of up to $3,000. Personal
reemployment account funds could be
used for three things: 1) to purchase
reemployment services, 2) as a
reemployment bonus, and 3) as extended
income maintenance for exhaustees of
regular UI benefits. Personal
reemployment account offers would be
targeted to UI beneficiaries most likely to
exhaust their UI entitlements using state
Worker Profiling and Reemployment
Services (WPRS) models.
If PRAs are enacted, core services at
one-stop career centers would remain free
to all customers, but PRA recipients
wishing to use intensive, supportive, and
job training services would be required to
use account funds to purchase them from
a qualified public or private vendor.
Additionally, PRA recipients who return
to work within 13 weeks of their UI claim
date may receive the unused balance in
the PRA as a cash reemployment bonus.
Sixty percent of the balance would be
paid upon reemployment with the

remainder payable after six months steady
employment. Those failing to gain
reemployment and exhausting regular UI
entitlement could draw support payments
from their PRAs at the rate of their
weekly benefit amounts (WBAs).
The PRA proposal combines several
employment initiatives in an innovative
way, but legislation authorizing PRAs has
not yet been enacted. However, the

PRA offers would be targeted
to UI beneficiaries most likely to
exhaust their UI entitlements
using state WPRS models

proposal remains active and has the
president’s continued support. The W.E.
Upjohn Institute has investigated aspects
of how the proposed PRAs would work
under a grant from the U.S. Department
of Labor. The Institute conducted PRA
simulation analyses using a unique data
set for the state of Georgia linking UI
claims and employment services records
(O’Leary and Eberts 2003). To be
forward looking, our simulations used the
new WPRS model now being
implemented in Georgia.
1
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PRA Budgets and Service Prices
The proposed $3.6 billion for PRA
enrollments over two years requires funds
be distributed to states in proportion to
their share of national unemployment.
Based on 2002 unemployment figures,
Georgia’s share would be 2.37 percent or
$85.32 million. The proposal also
requires that PRA funds be allocated
within states in proportion to regional
shares of state unemployment. Given that
offers are to be targeted using WPRS
scores to those most likely to exhaust
their benefit entitlement, nearly all offers
would be made to UI claimants in the top
30 percent of the state WPRS distribution
of claimant scores. Consequently, we
focus our simulations on that group of
claimants.
Since the simulation analysis required
monetary values for services,
hypothetical prices were set based on
statewide service expenditures, service
usage rates, and relative valuations for
services. Based on our sample for
analysis, Table 1 summarizes imputed
prices for services as well as usage rates
during the two PRA relevant time
periods: the first 13 weeks and the
remaining 39 weeks in the UI benefit
year. In addition to supportive and
training services, Georgia one-stop
centers offer five types of intensive
services. The most popular intensive
services among those potentially eligible
for a PRA are customer service plan and
counseling. The table shows that among
those profiled, 18.9 and 20.3 percent of

claimants used these services during the
first 13 weeks. The table further shows
that the bulk of service use occurs in that
earlier time frame. Relatively small
proportions of UI claimants use either
supportive or training services, which are
imputed to be most costly.
PRA Simulations
Our simulations focus on estimating
the average expected cost per $3,000
PRA offer, and the number of offers
possible over two years given the budget.
Estimates of these magnitudes are critical
for states planning for PRA enrollment
over a two-year cycle. The simulations
also provide evidence on the pattern of
service use, bonus receipt, and income

Relatively small proportions
of UI claimants use either
supportive or training
services, which are imputed
to be most costly.

maintenance payments likely to result
under PRAs.
To span the range of possible
responses to PRA offers, our simulations
include a baseline of no change in
behavior regarding service use and UI
benefit receipt, as well as impacts
shortening UI duration by 1 and 2 weeks.
These alternatives encompass the range of

Table 1 Estimated Services Usage Rates and Prices for Intensive, Supportive, and
Training Services among WPRS Profiled UI Claimants in Georgia,
Program Year 2001
Services

Up to 13 weeks
(%)

After 13 weeks
(%)

Hypothetical prices
($)

Intensive services
Service coordination
Customer service plan
In-depth assessment
Counseling
Expanded workshop

0.5

0.2

356

18.9

4.6

356

0.1

0.0

712

20.3

5.1

712

0.4

0.3

712

Supportive services

1.7

0.6

1,068

Training services

2.7

1.8

1,424

2

Table 2 Sample Percentages by
Employment Status in PRA
Time Periods among
Recipients Profiled to be
Most Likely to Exhaust
UI Benefits
Employed
in first
13 weeks

Employed after 13 weeks
Yes

No

Yes

26.7

13.5

No

9.9

49.9

responses observed in the UI
reemployment bonus experiments
(Robins and Spiegelman 2001). The
simulation grants a first bonus payment
for UI duration of less than 13 weeks, and
a second bonus payment when there are
also positive earnings in the first and third
quarters following the claim and at least
$2,000 in earnings the second quarter.
Under the proposal, a second bonus is not
paid if reemployment services are
purchased after a first bonus payment.
Table 2 shows that for the baseline
simulation, 26.7 percent of the sample
could be paid both bonuses—provided
funds remained in the PRA after purchase
of services—while a total of 40.2 percent
of those potentially offered a bonus
appear to qualify for a first bonus
payment. Since they did not gain
employment during the first 13 weeks,
58.8 percent of the sample would not
qualify for either bonus but could use
PRA funds for services or income support
payments after benefit exhaustion.
If every UI claimant offered a PRA
accepted, and if every recipient spent the
entire $3,000 grant, then 28,440 offers
could be made over two years with the
Georgia budget of $85.32 million.
However, it is unlikely that all account
recipients will spend their entire grant.
Table 3 summarizes the average cost per
offer given the prices and usage pattern
for services observed in Georgia. Since
there is uncertainty about what elements
of PRAs may emerge from current
deliberations or future proposals, the table
presents results for three combinations: 1)
bonus, purchase of services, and
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Table 3 Average Cost per PRA Offer for Alternative Combinations of Features ($)
PRA scenario

Baseline

1-week impact

2-week impact

Bonus, purchase services, and
UI exhaustee payments

2,475

2,515

2,551

Bonus and purchase services

1,452

1,491

1,528

Bonus only with free services

1,040

1,086

1,131

exhaustee payments, 2) bonus and
purchase of services, and 3) bonus only
with free services.
The Average Cost of PRA Offers
The top row of Table 3 reports that
offers with all three elements would cost
an average of $2,475 in the absence of
any behavioral response. If durations for
those offered PRAs are 1 week shorter,
the average cost per offer rises by $40, if
the response is 2 weeks the cost rises by
$76 per offer from the baseline. The
increased cost results from more
beneficiaries becoming employed soon
enough to qualify for bonus payments.
The average cost increases resulting
from responses to the PRA offer are
modest.
If the extended jobless benefits feature
of PRAs is eliminated, the average
baseline cost of a $3,000 account drops
more than $1,000 to $1,452. Accounting
for 1- and 2-week behavioral responses
increases the average cost by $39 and
$76, respectively.
The bottom row of Table 3 shows costs
associated with simplified PRAs
involving only a targeted reemployment
bonus. Simulations for Georgia indicate
that the baseline $3,000 bonus offer
would cost $1,040 in payments, and if
insured durations declined by 1 or 2
weeks the costs would rise by $46 and

$91, respectively. Previous analysis of
targeted reemployment bonuses
suggested that cash offers as large as
$3,000 would not be cost effective, but
smaller offers could be cost effective
while still encouraging quicker return to
work (O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner
forthcoming).
The Number of PRA Offers Possible
Table 4 translates the PRA average
cost figures into estimates of the number
of offers that could be made assuming
100 percent acceptance of PRA offers.
An 80 percent acceptance rate was
observed in the Illinois bonus experiment,
which required a formal acceptance of the
offer (Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987).
Assuming that acceptance is not
correlated with factors systematically
influencing the rate of spending from
PRAs, enrollment estimates could be
adjusted by a factor equal to the
reciprocal of the take-up rate. Our
simulations indicate that the baseline
PRA with all three elements could be
offered to 34,473 Georgia UI claimants
over two years. That is about 17,000 per
year, or about 6.3 percent of Georgia UI
claimants based on 2001 data. The PRA
proposal targets WPRS profiled claimants
most likely to exhaust benefits who are
initially eligible for at least 20 weeks of
benefits, and 17,000 offers constitute

Table 4 Number of PRA Offers Possible in Georgia over Two Years for
Alternative Combinations of Features Assuming All Offers Are Accepted
PRA scenario

Baseline

1-week impact

2-week impact

Bonus, purchase services, and
UI exhaustee payments

34,473

33,924

33,446

Bonus and purchase services

65,149

63,538

62,111

Bonus only with free services

93,403

89,473

85,929

about 13 percent of this target group in
Georgia. Even with a 1- or 2-week
behavioral response, the Georgia budget
would permit nearly 17,000 offers per
year.
If the PRA included only the bonus
and purchase of services, not the
extended benefits feature, more than
31,000 offers per year could be made
with the Georgia budget regardless of
the behavioral response. For offers that
were simply $3,000 targeted bonuses,
more than 43,000 offers per year could
be made with the PRA grant to Georgia.
Additional Program Design
Considerations
Our simulation results are very robust
relative to the assumed service prices.
Cutting service prices in half would
increase the number of offers possible by
only about 20 percent. However, there is
uncertainty about how charging for

If the extended jobless benefits
feature of PRAs is eliminated,
the average baseline cost of a
$3,000 account drops more
than $1,000 to $1,452.

services would affect the pattern of
services chosen.
Under what conditions would a PRA
recipient either purchase services or take
their chances and pursue bonus
payments? To investigate this question,
we identified the reemployment
outcomes that would make a participant
financially indifferent toward the
following two extremes: 1) purchasing
no services with the hope of receiving
the full PRA amount in bonus
payments, or 2) spending the entire
PRA amount to purchase services with
the hope of speeding up reemployment
or receiving a higher reemployment
wage. To spend the entire budget on
services, the UI beneficiary must expect
either earnings to be nearly 14 percent
higher or that employment will occur at
least 6 weeks sooner. Research on
3
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employment and earnings effects of
employment services and job training
suggest effects are more modest (Leigh
1995). PRA recipients might therefore
reduce use of services in hopes of
receiving larger reemployment bonuses.
We also checked to see if $3,000
would be sufficient to purchase the
bundles of services chosen given the
assumed prices. If no PRA money was
spent on bonuses and all on services,
about one-half of 1 percent of the UI
claimants in our Georgia sample would
have a budget shortfall. Among these

To spend the entire budget
on services, the UI beneficiary
must expect either earnings to
be nearly 14 percent higher
or that employment will occur
at least 6 weeks sooner.

claimants, the mean budget shortfall was
$551 in the first 13 weeks and $637
during the remainder of the UI benefit
year.
The PRA proposal requires that the
amount of the PRA be uniform
throughout the state and not exceed
$3,000. Since the UI reemployment
experiments set bonus offers as multiples
of the WBA we simulated setting PRAs
as 10 times the WBA, with a minimum of
$1,500. The maximum WBA in Georgia
is $300. This design would permit about
15 percent more bonus offers, and it also
may moderate the incentive for some
claimants to accept low-paying jobs
simply to qualify for the first bonus paid
upon reemployment.
The UI reemployment experiments
paid bonuses only after at least 16 weeks
of continuous reemployment. In these
experiments, the reemployment earnings
of those offered bonuses were at least as
high as the control groups. The timing of
bonus payments under the proposed
PRAs might yield a different impact on
wages.
The proposed formula for PRA budget
allocations to states and local service
4
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delivery regions within states is
determined by the estimated share of
unemployment. This formula will yield a
disproportionate share of PRA dollars to
qualified UI claimants in states with
relatively exclusionary UI eligibility
conditions. The total unemployment rate
exceeds the insured unemployment rate
by a greater margin in such areas. Since
PRAs are offered only to UI claimants,
the allocation could more equitably be
based on the state and local share of
insured unemployment. Changing the
allocation rule to be based on insured
unemployment would not penalize states
that have higher rates.
Summary
Economists have long touted the
merits of incentives, pricing, and
targeting in social programs, particularly
reemployment programs. These features
have been tried in demonstration
programs and some are now used in
Individual Training Accounts and the
WPRS system. However, all three
features previously have not been
combined in the same program.
Simulations suggest that successful
implementation of such a program
requires an understanding of the possible
responses by participants. Simulations
also point to the range of behavioral
responses necessary for PRAs to function
well. While findings from past studies
indicate that measured responses to
reemployment bonuses and expected
wage gains from services fall short of
what is necessary for participants to
choose services over the bonus, final
assessment of PRAs awaits
implementation or demonstration of the
program.
For links to additional information on
PRAs, visit http://www.upjohninstitute.
org/pra.html.
Christopher J. O’Leary is a senior
economist at the Upjohn Institute.
Randall W. Eberts is executive director of
the Upjohn Institute.
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